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Scientism as a Threat to Science: Wittgenstein on Self-Subverting Methodologies 
[FINAL AUTHOR’S DRAFT] 
 
Chon Tejedor 
 
Wittgenstein is typically viewed as concerned with one particular variety of scientism: scientism 
understood as the threat posed by the application of scientific practices to areas of our lives in 
which they do not belong.1 In this reading, Wittgenstein’s primary concern about scientism is that 
science should not overreach its purview: the scientific approach is legitimate within the 
boundaries of scientific enquiry, but should not encroach into other areas, where different 
standards and procedures apply – in particular, into ethics, religion or philosophy. I will call this 
the ‘dominant reading’.  
This understanding of Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with scientism is not unfounded and 
certainly comes to the fore at several junctures (e.g. CV 7). I propose to show, however, that too 
narrow a focus on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s treatment of scientism distorts both his thinking 
on science and the nature of his preoccupation with scientism. This, at any rate, is the picture that 
emerges when we consider this question from the perspective of his early remarks on science, in 
the Tractatus and ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, presented at a meeting of The Heretics Society in 
Cambridge, in 1929.2 (Although the Tractatus was written more than ten years before ‘A Lecture 
on Ethics’, Wittgenstein’s position on a number of key issues did not substantially change in the 
interim. Indeed, many of the themes from the former, including his notion of a ‘world book’ – cf. 
TLP 5.631 – remain central to the latter.) 
In section 1, I summarise the dominant interpretation of Wittgenstein’s concern over 
scientism. In section 2, I revisit the Tractatus’ discussion of scientific propositions and argue that 
the dominant interpretation misrepresents Wittgenstein’s early approach to the natural sciences. 
In section 3, I defend the idea that Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with scientism is part of a 
broader and more fundamental preoccupation with self-subverting methodologies and with the 
threat that these pose to all areas – including science itself.     
 
1. Scientism as the threat from science  
The dominant reading begins with a particular understanding of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
science. In this view, scientific inquiry involves constructing senseful propositions that are truth-
assessable, bivalent and bipolar. Senseful scientific propositions are characterised by at least one 
of the following:  
 
1. They represent possible states, in particular obtaining ones – i.e. facts. 
2. They give empirical descriptions of facts. 
3. They make statements about possible states or facts based on inductive reasoning. 
4. They give causal explanations or make statements about the causal relations – or 
causal mechanisms – that hold between possible states and/or facts.  
 
With this understanding of Wittgenstein’s approach to science in place, his concern over 
scientism is presented as the concern that the scientific approach – characterised by the 
generation of such propositions – should not be extended to areas of our lives in which it does not 
belong. In particular (though not exclusively): it should not be extended to religion and ethics 
(Phillips, 1993, esp. 57–58).  
The early section of ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ is often cited as presenting this view: 
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Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and 
conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is 
supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full 
of water [even] if I were to pour out a gallon over it. (LE 3) 
 
A similar idea can be extracted from Wittgenstein’s discussion of a miracle later in the lecture: 
 
Take the case that one of you suddenly grew a lion's head and he began to roar. Certainly 
that would be as extraordinary a thing as I can imagine. Now whenever we should have 
recovered from our surprise, what I would suggest would be to fetch a doctor and have 
the case scientifically investigated and if it were not for hurting him I would have him 
vivisected. And where would the miracle have got to? For it is clear that when we look at 
it in this way everything miraculous has disappeared; unless what we mean by this term is 
merely that a fact has not yet been explained by science which again means that we have 
hitherto failed to group this fact with others in a scientific system. This shows that it is 
absurd to say ‘Science has proved that there are no miracles.’ The truth is that the 
scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle. (LE 7) 
 
I will call the concern that scientific approaches illegitimately encroach into other areas – notably 
those of ethics or religion – the concern over scientism as a threat from science. There is no 
doubt that Wittgenstein repeatedly expresses concerns over scientism as a threat from science. I 
propose to show, however, that we misunderstand his position when we read it as arising from 
hostility towards science, or as consisting primarily in the worry that science – as such – will 
dominate other areas.  
I would like, firstly, to motivate the idea that the dominant reading involves an unduly 
simplified understanding of Wittgenstein’s view of science and, secondly, show that there is a 
better way to understand his position on scientism.  
 
2. Wittgenstein’s early writings on science 
Even in a text like ‘A Lecture on Ethics’, which is sometimes regarded as presenting the epitome 
of Wittgenstein’s concern over STFS, his attitude towards science is subtler and more complex 
than is at times supposed. At the start of that lecture, Wittgenstein states: 
 
I should not misuse this opportunity to give you a lecture about, say, logic. I call this a 
misuse, for to explain a scientific matter to you it would need a course of lectures and not 
an hour's paper. Another alternative would have been to give you what's called a popular 
scientific lecture, that is a lecture intended to make you believe that you understand a 
thing which actually you don't understand, and to gratify what I believe to be one of the 
lowest desires of modern people, namely the superficial curiosity about the latest 
discoveries of science. I rejected these alternatives. (LE 3) 
 
Two points are worth noting about this passage. The first is that Wittgenstein draws an analogy 
between his own task as logician and that of the scientist – and goes as far as to portray logic as a 
‘scientific matter’. This does not sit well with the suggestion that his concern over scientism in 
the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ stems from hostility towards science.3 Indeed, it is striking that, in his 
discussion of the miracle example, he imagines himself as approaching the miraculous situation 
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in a scientific way: ‘Now whenever we should have recovered from our surprise, what I would 
suggest [in the first person] would be to fetch a doctor and have the case scientifically 
investigated and if it were not for hurting him I would have him vivisected’ (LE 9). Secondly, it 
is important to note the contrast that Wittgenstein draws between scientific explanations and 
popular science, the latter of which he seems to regard as distasteful – possibly even dishonest. I 
will return to this idea in section 3. Before I do, I would like to explore in more detail what might 
be behind the analogy that he draws between logic and science in the ‘Lecture on Ethics’.  
 Why does Wittgenstein draw an analogy between logic and science in this text? Such an 
analogy makes little sense if we understand science in the manner portrayed by the dominant 
reading. For Wittgenstein certainly does not, during this period, regard the task of the logician – 
insofar as she has a task at all – to be that of constructing senseful propositions (let alone ones 
characterised by 1–4 – see above, section 1).4 It would seem therefore that Wittgenstein either 
makes a mistake in drawing this analogy or that his understanding of science is quite different 
from that presented in the dominant reading – different in a manner that does, after all, support 
his analogy between logic and science. The Tractatus’ discussion of science points to the latter 
idea, as we will now see.  
Contrary to what is commonly suggested (cf. McGuinness 2002, 116–123), in the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein does not regard the natural sciences as circumscribed to the producing of senseful 
propositions. Indeed, in this text, Wittgenstein’s interest in science is twofold. It is an interest in 
the subject matter of science (as expressed by the senseful propositions in 1–4). And it is an 
interest in the scientific principles constitutive of the (scientific) representational systems within 
which those senseful propositions are produced. This twofold interest and the two associated 
notions of proposition emerge clearly in the following entry from the Tractatus:  
 
Mechanics determine a form of description by saying: All propositions [Sätze] in the 
description of the world must be obtained in a given way from a number of given 
propositions – the mechanical axioms. It thus provides the bricks for building the edifice of 
science, and says: ‘Any building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow 
be constructed with these bricks, and with these alone.’ (TLP 6.341). 
 
Imposing a unified form involves homing in on certain propositions (or ‘axioms’) that provide 
instructions, within a particular system, for the construction of other propositions (the latter being 
the ‘propositions in the description of the world’). Although Wittgenstein uses the same term 
‘proposition’ (Satz) in both cases, he clearly regards these two types of proposition as performing 
quite different roles: the former provide instructions for how to construct the latter; the latter are 
senseful propositions that are part of the ‘the description of the world’. I will use the expression 
‘instruction-proposition’ to refer to the former and to distinguish these from senseful propositions.  
I suggest that Wittgenstein’s notion of a principle (Gesetz) is precisely that of a proposition 
(Satz) that is used to provide instructions for the construction of senseful propositions within a 
given system.5 Wittgenstein suggests that the principles of the natural sciences – i.e. these 
instruction-propositions – are a priori. He writes: 
 
All propositions, such as the law of causation, the law of continuity in nature, the law of 
least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., all these are a priori insights [Einsichten] of possible 
forms of the propositions of science (TLP 6.34) 
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In the previous entry, Wittgenstein is careful to note that the a priori insights in question are not 
a priori beliefs (or mental representations), but a type of a priori knowledge: 
 
We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation, but we know a priori the possibility of a 
logical form (TLP 6.33) 
 
The understanding of knowledge at work in this remark is that of ability-knowledge or know-how 
(cf. Tejedor 2015a, 15–72; 91–118). This type of knowing does not consist in entertaining 
particular beliefs (i.e. ones that are justified and true) or mental representations; instead, it 
involves the ability to use signs in particular ways for specific purposes. Knowing the principles 
of a given natural science system therefore involves being able to construct senseful propositions 
according to a unified set of instructions – according to a ‘single plan’ (TLP 6.343). Our 
knowledge of these principles – and, therefore, our knowledge of the form in question – is prior 
to experience, not in that it must involve beliefs that are not derived from experience (where both 
experience and beliefs are mental representations), but in that it is a type of know-how: it is the 
know-how or ability to construct senseful representations (propositions, iconic pictures, but also 
mental representations, including beliefs and experiences) according to the instructions pertaining 
to a particular system.  
Whilst Wittgenstein suggests that the form and associated set of principles of a given 
system are a priori, he also notes they are ‘arbitrary’ – or optional (‘beliebig’ in the original) (cf. 
TLP [PM] 6.341). As he writes: 
  
This form is arbitrary […] To the different networks correspond different systems of 
describing the world (TLP 6.341) 
 
These different forms – with their different associated sets of principles or instruction-
propositions – are optional in that we can move between them (and their associated principles) 
(TLP 6.341). I will return to this below.  
 For Wittgenstein, the notion of form is intimately connected with that of use: form – e.g. 
the form of a proposition, of a thought, of an iconic picture, of a name, etc. – is shown in the use 
of signs (cf. Tejedor 2015a, 15–45). Consider the logical form of a picture – that is, a picture’s 
analysability into elementary pictures. Wittgenstein suggests that, when we use signs to express a 
senseful picture (be it a senseful proposition, a thought or an iconic picture), this use of signs 
shows the logical form of the picture. The use of signs shows that we are expressing a picture 
with a determinate sense and therefore a picture ultimately analysable into logically independent 
elementary pictures consisting of simple names. Wittgenstein indicates that logical form is an 
essential feature of senseful pictures qua pictures. Indeed, if our use of signs did not express a 
determinate sense and thereby showed logical form, in the Tractatus it would not count as 
expressing a picture at all: it would not count as representational. 
 Whilst Tractarian logical form is, in this respect, an essential feature of senseful pictures, 
representational form – say, that a proposition is expressed in English rather than Spanish – is not. 
Like logical form, the representational form of a picture is shown in our use of signs. However, 
the representational form of a picture is not essential to it qua picture. It consists in the accidental 
features of the picture, features that are not essential requirements of representation (TLP 3.34). 
These accidental features emerge as a result of the ‘tacit conventions’ that are ‘a part of the 
human organism’ (TLP [PM] 4.002). The fact that certain psychological, physiological, etc. traits 
happen to be distributed amongst human beings in the ways that they are, together with other 
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facts about our physical environment, constitute a ‘human organism’. The conventions in 
question may therefore change over time, as the facts about human beings or the environment 
change.  
 For Wittgenstein, those aspects of the use of signs that show logical form circumscribe 
what counts – essentially – as senseful representation (in language, thought, or iconic depiction). 
In contrast, those that show representational form circumscribe what counts as expressing sense 
in a particular (optional) representational system.  
 I suggest that Wittgenstein’s distinction between the essential and accidental aspects of 
form (his distinction between logical and representational forms) is central to understanding the 
notion of form that emerges in his discussion of the natural sciences. The forms of the natural 
sciences are optional in that they are accidental aspects of form. In this respect, scientific forms 
are akin to representational form but not to logical form. A senseful proposition generated 
according to the principles of a system in the natural sciences will thus display a variety of forms: 
insofar as it is senseful, it will display essential logical form; insofar as it is an English 
proposition, it will display a particular, accidental representational form (i.e. that associated with 
the conventions of the English language); and insofar as it depicts reality according to a particular 
system from the natural sciences, it will display the accidental form associated with that scientific 
system.  
In order to illustrate this idea further, let us briefly consider Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
causation in physics. In the TLP 6.3ff, Wittgenstein introduces three important related notions: 
the notion of causal form (TLP 6.32), that of causal principle (TLP 6.321) and that of senseful 
causal proposition (i.e. a causal claim or causal statement – a senseful propositions in a causal 
form, e.g. a causal description – cf. TLP 6.343). Wittgenstein’s discussion suggests that causal 
principles are instruction-propositions that circumscribe which senseful propositions count as 
causal within a given system in physics. Put differently: causal principles are instructions for the 
use of causal signs within a particular system. It is part of the remit of physics to come up with 
such instructions or causal principles, and the principles that constitute the system may change 
over time.  
Consider for instance the shift from the view that causation involves an exchange of 
particles to the view that causation involves an interaction between the force fields of particles. 
This amounts to a shift from one set of instructions to another: the latter set of instructions allows 
for action at a distance, the former does not. Say that we are looking at the conjunctive 
proposition ‘the earth’s mass is m at t and the ball falls when I let it go from s at t’, where m is a 
particular mass, t a point in time and s a spatial location. Following the second set of instructions 
– i.e. the one that allows for action at a distance – involves counting this conjunctive proposition 
as a suitable candidate for translation into causal terms. This system allows for the claim ‘the 
mass of the earth being m at t causes the ball to fall when I let it go from s at t’. In contrast, the 
set of instructions associated with the view that causation involves an exchange of particles, 
excluding as it does action at a distance, rules out this translation of the conjunctive proposition 
into causal terms.  
This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s remark in ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ to the effect that 
when a ‘fact has not yet been explained by science [this] means that we have hitherto failed to 
group this fact with others in a scientific system’ (LE 10–11). Translating the conjunctive 
proposition into the causal one involves grouping facts according to one particular ‘scientific 
system’. It seems likely that, in Wittgenstein’s view, the process of moving from one system to 
another involves the kind of relative (i.e. instrumental, means-ends) evaluative judgement which 
is thinkable and describable in language.  
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In ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ he certainly aligns this form of relative evaluative judgement with 
the natural sciences. He writes that the ‘scientific book’ (LE 6 – cf. TLP 5.631) would be such as 
to ‘contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true 
propositions that can be made’ (LE 8). Although Wittgenstein does not discuss this idea 
explicitly in the Tractatus, it is likely that he regards shifts from one optional scientific system to 
another to be based on precisely such ‘relative judgements of value’ performed against the 
background of the facts (cf. McGuinness, 2002, 129–130).  
Wittgenstein suggests that scientific representational systems – for instance, causal ones – 
obscure possibilities from view (cf. TLP 6.342). As we will see, he does not regard this obscuring 
as something negative, though: on the contrary, obscuring certain possibilities from view goes 
hand-in-hand with rendering other possibilities salient to us – in particular, those possibilities 
instrumentally connected to our empirical survival.6  Causal language and thinking obscure from 
view certain possibilities, rendering them (and the propositions that represent them) less visible 
or salient within that system. This remains a central plank of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
causation and the natural sciences in later years. Consider, for instance, the following remarks: 
 
We are accustomed to think of things in terms of a very few definite possibilities. If two 
cylinders are such that one is smaller than the other, we say that one will turn inside the 
other. If it does not, we say something must be stopping it. It might be very puzzling why it 
does not turn and we might say that there must be a cause for it not turning. (AWL 82) 
 
We talk as though these parts [of the machine] could only move in this way, as if they 
could not do anything else. 
  How is this – do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting 
and so on? Yes; in many cases we don’t think of that at all (RFM 84–85)  
 
Part of the idea behind these remarks is that this obscuring of possibilities is needed in that, as a 
matter of (contingent) psychological fact, human beings are simply not geared to live life with all 
logical possibilities equally or plainly in view.7 Interestingly, a similar process of obscuring 
possibilities from view occurs, according to the Tractatus, in the move from the fully analysed 
level of elementary pictures (which possess essential features only) to the level of non-analysed, 
everyday non-scientific natural languages (where propositions possess both essential and 
accidental features). Wittgenstein writes: 
 
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. 
  Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the 
clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward 
form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different 
purposes (TLP [PM] 4.002) 
 
Although non-analysed everyday and scientific languages obscure possibilities from view, this 
obscuring does not result in nonsense for Wittgenstein. On the contrary:  
 
In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order (TLP 5.5563) 
 
The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (TLP 4.11) 
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Whilst these systems obscure possibilities, they succeed in producing senseful propositions 
insofar as they are unified by logical form. In this respect, logic is, for Wittgenstein, the ultimate 
net – the ultimate system.  
 
How can the all-embracing logic which mirrors the world use such special catches and 
manipulations? Only because all these are connected into an infinitely fine network, the 
great mirror (TLP 5.511) 
 
The logical net, rather than being akin to a mesh which inevitably obscures part of what it covers, 
is akin to a mirror that captures what it reflects in a perspicuous manner without obscuring any of 
its elements. 
 
Propositions cannot represent the logical form: this mirrors itself in the propositions. 
 That which mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent. 
 That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language. 
 The propositions show the logical form of reality. 
 They exhibit it (TLP 4.121) 
 
That the logical net is more like a perspicuous mirror than like an inevitably obscuring mesh 
emerges again when we consider that logic is what enables us to move from the non-analysed 
level, where pictures have both essential and accidental features (and thus show both logical and 
accidental forms), to the fully analysed level of elementary pictures possessing only essential 
features and showing only logical form (TLP 3.323; TLP 4.0311). For Wittgenstein, only 
elementary pictures are capable of guaranteeing a complete description of the world – that is, a 
description of the world that presents all possibilities in a perspicuous manner. All 
representational systems produce, according to Wittgenstein, senseful pictures analysable into 
elementary pictures; but this means, in turn, that all representational systems are to an extent 
translatable into each other. Elementary pictures provide the translation interface for moving 
from any one such system to another.  
 
The specification of all true elementary propositions describes the world completely. The 
world is completely described by the specification of all elementary propositions plus the 
specification, which of them are true and which false (TLP 4.26) 
 
Suppose all elementary propositions were given me: then we can simply ask: what 
propositions I can build out of them. And these are all propositions and so are they limited 
(TLP 4.51) 
  
The suggestion is therefore that a complete description of the world can only be guaranteed with 
one net – or system; in particular, the one that generates elementary pictures possessing essential 
features alone: logic itself. Beyond this level, all representational systems involve the obscuring 
of some possibilities. Wittgenstein indicates that we move from one system to another by means 
of translation rules: 
 
Definitions are rules [Regeln] for the translation of one language into another. Every correct 
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symbolism must be translatable into every other according to such rules. It is this which all 
have in common (TLP 3.343) 
 
This opens the way for a deflationary understanding of Wittgenstein’s view that logic is 
transcendental:  
 
Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image [Spiegelbild] of the world. 
Logic is transcendental. (TLP [PM] 6.13) 
 
When Wittgenstein writes that logic is transcendental, he is not suggesting that logic is a pre-
condition of either representation or the world. For the idea of a pre-condition is the idea of an 
external (mechanistic) relation: to suggest that logic is a pre-condition of representation is to 
suggest that logic is conceptually prior to representation, that it can be specified independently of 
representation so that logic could, in principle, be given in advance – that is, in the absence – of 
representation. Instead, logic is transcendental for Wittgenstein in that it is internal to or 
constitutive of representation and, thus, of the correlation between representation and world.  
This helps to shed light on Wittgenstein’s understanding of the relation between logic and 
science – the question that emerged in our initial discussion of ‘A Lecture on Ethics’. For the 
principles of logic and those of the natural sciences, together with the conventional principles of 
natural languages, share important aspects in common. Firstly, all of these principles can be used 
to provide instructions for the construction of senseful pictures within particular systems. It is in 
this respect that they all count as principles. In connection to logic, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
The proposition constructs a world with the help of logical scaffolding, and therefore one 
can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true 
(TLP 4.023) 
 
If we are given the general form of the way in which a proposition is constructed, then 
thereby we are also given the general form of the way in which by an operation out of one 
proposition another can be created (TLP 6.002) 
 
In connection to the principles of the natural sciences, he writes: 
 
Mechanics determine a form of description by saying: All propositions in the description of 
the world must be obtained in a given way from a number of given propositions—the 
mechanical axioms. It thus provides the bricks for building the edifice of science, and says: 
‘Any building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed 
with these bricks, and with these alone’ (TLP 6.341) 
 
In connection to the conventional principles of everyday, natural languages he writes:  
 
Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without 
having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak 
without knowing how the individual sounds are produced. 
  Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated 
than it. […] 
  The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends 
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are enormously complicated (TLP [PM] 4.002) 
 
Secondly, our knowledge of the principles of logic, the natural sciences and natural languages is 
a priori: it is prior to experience, not in that it involves having beliefs not derived from 
experience, but in that it is a particular type of know-how. Knowledge of these principles is 
knowledge of a form: it involves being able to construct senseful pictures (propositions, iconic 
pictures, but also mental representations) according to the instructions pertaining to a particular 
system.  
 
We do not believe a priori in a law of conservation, but we know a priori the possibility of a 
logical form (TLP 6.33) 
  
In the above remark, Wittgenstein draws on a distinction between logical form as such and a 
logical form: logical form consists in the analysability of a picture into elementary pictures (those 
that form the translation interface between systems); a logical form, in contrast, is any unified 
form or system that generates senseful pictures possessing accidental as well as essential features 
(or logical form). In this respect, causal form is a logical form, as are particular representational 
forms (e.g. the representational form of the English language): 
 
Every picture is also a logical picture. (On the other hand, for example, not every picture is 
spatial) (TLP 2.182) 
 
Whilst the principles of logic, the natural sciences and natural languages share these aspects in 
common, there are also important respects in which they differ. The central point of difference is, 
of course, that whereas the principles of logic are essential to representation, the principles of 
scientific systems and those of natural languages are not. The principles of logic are essential to 
representation in that a use of signs that is not logical is simply not a representational use of 
signs: it does not count as expressing a representational picture. A proposition can, however, be 
senseful without being causal, or without being expressed in the English language.  
 This relates to a further disanalogy between the principles of logic and those of the natural 
sciences and natural languages. For since the latter two are optional, expressing these principles 
by means of propositions can be informative in a manner that logical principles never can. For 
Wittgenstein, the only purpose to be served by presenting an instruction of logic in the form of a 
proposition is the psychological purpose of reminding us of a know-how we already possess, 
insofar as we already have mastery of language and thought. In other words, the need to express 
logical principles arises only by virtue of the fact that our memory happens, as a matter of 
psychological fact, to fail us (cf. Tejedor 2015a, 15–72, 119–137). In contrast, expressing the 
principles of the natural sciences or the conventions of natural languages by means of 
propositions can serve an additional purpose, namely that of stipulating and informing that a new 
system – out of the various optional ones – is now in play.  
The role that scientific and natural language principles serve in this respect is quite 
distinctive: it is genuinely informative, in the sense of being capable of conveying something new. 
This helps to explain why Wittgenstein is comfortable with the idea that axioms play a genuine 
role in the natural sciences, but not in logic. Indeed, Wittgenstein is consistently negative about 
the notion of logical axioms: 
 
Propositions like Russell’s ‘axiom of reducibility’ are not logical propositions, and this 
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explains our feeling that, if true, they can only be true by a happy chance (TLP 6.1232) 
 
We can imagine a world in which the axiom of reducibility is not valid. But it is clear that 
logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world is really of this kind or not 
(TLP 6.1233) 
 
So all problems disappear which are connected with such pseudo-propositions. 
 This is the place to solve all the problems with arise through Russell’s ‘Axiom of Infinity’. 
 What the axiom of infinity is meant to say would be expressed in language by the fact that 
there is an infinite number of names with different meanings (TLP 5.535) 
  
In contrast, there is no hint, in his discussion of mechanics and the natural sciences, that he 
regards the notion of an axiom, in this context, as problematic. 
 
Mechanics determine a form of description by saying: All propositions in the description of 
the world must be obtained in a given way from a number of given propositions—the 
mechanical axioms (TLP 6.341) 
  
Insofar as scientific principles capture optional instructions or stipulations, they are informative 
in a way that Russell’s purported logical axioms could never be. And, insofar as they are 
informative, they serve a genuine purpose. This notion of purpose is central to Wittgenstein’s 
early thinking, as we will now see.    
  
3. Scientism as a threat to science 
Wittgenstein’s discussion of the principles of the natural sciences casts serious doubts on an 
assumption present in much of the literature: the assumption that in the Tractatus, if a proposition 
is neither senseful nor senseless, it must be automatically nonsensical.8 The Tractatus’ discussion 
of scientific principles suggests that this misrepresents Wittgenstein’s position. Note indeed that 
the propositions that express these laws or principles – the instruction-propositions from the 
various natural science systems – are not senseful, senseless or nonsensical in his view. These 
propositions are a priori, optional and not truth-assessable: they are a priori insofar as they are 
used as instructions (akin to imperative commands) for the generation of senseful (linguistic, 
mental or iconic) pictures within unified systems; they are optional in that the instructions in 
question belong to systems that can be opted in or out; and finally, unlike both senseful and 
senseless propositions, they are not truth-assessable, since their role is not to represent 
possibilities, but to stipulate representational systems.  
Although for Wittgenstein, the instruction-propositions of the natural sciences are neither 
senseful nor senseless, at no point does he suggest that they are, for this reason, nonsensical. This 
gives us a key into Wittgenstein’s early understanding of nonsense: a proposition that is neither 
senseful nor senseless is not, for this reason, automatically nonsensical; rather, a proposition is 
nonsensical when it fails to serve a purpose. The purpose served by our use of signs need not be 
that of expressing senseful propositions; it can also be that of stipulating – that is, of conveying a 
new, optional, a priori instruction. Senseful propositions and the (neither senseful nor senseless) 
instruction-propositions of the natural sciences serve a purpose in that they are integral parts of 
working systems of representation, systems that are instrumentally valuable to us. For this reason, 
they are not nonsensical. 
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Nonsense, for Wittgenstein, is generated when signs are used to no purpose. Using signs 
to no purpose – i.e. nonsensically – is not always negative or to be avoided, though: indeed, using 
signs purposelessly can be entirely unobjectionable, according to Wittgenstein, when it is done in 
full awareness or in a deliberate manner – as, for instance, in certain forms of humour. This is 
exemplified by the postcard messages sent by Wittgenstein to Gilbert Pattison, which the former 
characterises as ‘nonsense’ (Monk 1990, 265 & Figure 42). Wittgenstein’s postcard messages are 
humorous precisely because they involve using signs to no purpose – i.e. nonsensically. 
Wittgenstein at no point suggests that this form of nonsense is in any way problematic, though. 
Nonsense only becomes pernicious when it arises from and promotes confusion.9 This typically 
occurs in situations where we think that we are using signs for a purpose, but our use in fact 
defeats this putative purpose: when we are under the illusion that we are engaged in a purposeful 
activity, but we are not. For Wittgenstein, this particular version of nonsense – let us call it self-
subverting nonsense – is central to a number of traditional philosophical practices that need to be 
overhauled: in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, logic, and ethics, 
amongst others.  
In logic, it emerges in Russell’s approach to logical entailment, logical variables and formal 
concepts, where logic is presented as the most general of natural sciences – a move that defeats 
itself, according to Wittgenstein (McGinn 2006, 53–74). It also emerges more broadly in 
metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, metaphysics attempts to combine philosophical and scientific 
practices in ways that are ultimately self-defeating.  
One of the legitimate aims of the natural sciences is to carry out empirical investigations of 
contingent facts and to generate descriptions of these facts (TLP 4.11). The facts that make up 
reality include contingent mechanisms involving external relations between facts and/or possible 
states. Consider for instance, the mechanism in a piano that connects a key to the hammer that 
strikes the string. This mechanism is contingent in various respects; in particular, it is possible 
that a different type of mechanism should connect the key to the hammer and deliver the same 
result. Part of the aim of the natural sciences, for Wittgenstein, is to identify and describe 
contingent mechanisms as they obtain in reality. Indeed, any questions concerning mechanisms – 
any questions as to how things happen to work or be produced or be caused in reality – are the 
purview of the natural sciences.  
Traditional metaphysics results in nonsense because it attempts to answer, in an a priori 
manner, empirical questions that are the purview of the natural sciences (cf. BB 35; Z §458). 
Wittgenstein suggests that traditional metaphysical questions are modelled on scientific questions 
concerning mechanisms. Consider for instance Wittgenstein’s discussion of metaphysical 
solipsism, in TLP 5.6ff. Solipsism, in this context, is the view that the subject is the necessary 
condition of representation and therefore of the world as given in representation. Wittgenstein 
suggests that, as a philosophical position, this is problematic. For it represents an attempt to 
answer the question ‘By virtue of what mechanism must representation occur?’ The question ‘By 
virtue of what mechanism does representation (as a matter of contingent fact) occur?’ is a well-
formed question – it is the legitimate purview of the natural sciences, a question that might well 
be asked, for instance, in psychology. The metaphysical question ‘By virtue of what mechanism 
must representation occur?’, by contrast, is not. The metaphysical question presents itself as 
informative: it is posed as if different options might genuinely be available to us here, different 
possible metaphysical answers (e.g. solipsism, idealism, realism) with their corresponding 
different possible mechanisms (respectively: I, we, reality). This creates the impression that there 
is clear purpose to asking this question: the question is asked for the purpose of selecting the 
correct metaphysical option out of those available. This apparent purpose is subverted, however, 
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by the suggestion that we are looking for what must – necessarily – be the case. It would seem 
that we are looking for the only answer possible – that which is necessary; but we are doing so in 
a manner that presumes that different options are possible. (There are several other respects in 
which such metaphysical positions are self-subverting, according to the Tractatus. I discuss this 
in more detail in Tejedor 2015a, 73–90.) 
 Traditional metaphysics is problematic in that it attempts to bring together methodologies 
(from philosophy and the natural sciences) in a manner that is self-defeating: the apparent 
purpose of the activity falls apart in our hands. In this respect, metaphysics fails to generate a 
unified working system: there is no ‘single plan’ (TLP 6.343) at work here, since any such plan 
finds itself subverted. For Wittgenstein, approaches such as this pose a threat to philosophy 
(properly understood) and to other areas, such as ethics and religion. Most significantly for us, 
they also pose a threat to science itself.  
 This idea – overlooked in the literature – emerges at several junctures in Wittgenstein’s 
writings. Consider, for instance, his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough (GB). There is no doubt 
that this text is partly devoted to Wittgenstein’s critique of Frazer’s approach to religion and 
magic, as has been aptly captured elsewhere, notably by Clack (1999). There is, however, a 
further dimension to this text, which often goes unnoticed, but which, I suggest, is just as 
important. For Wittgenstein’s aim in the Remarks is not just to expose Frazer’s treatment of 
religion and magic, but also his approach to anthropology. Frazer sets out to carry out an 
empirical investigation with the purpose of rendering the religious practices of the tribes he 
studies intelligible to himself and others. However, due to his own prior commitments (i.e. due to 
what we might call prejudice), Frazer ends up neither properly attending to the empirical 
evidence that is before him, nor bringing into play the subtlety and conceptual dispositional 
apparatus – the understanding of religious ritual – that would be required for his anthropology to 
bear fruit. Wittgenstein writes: 
 
It is very remarkable that in the final analysis all of these practices are presented [by Frazer] 
as, so to speak, pieces of stupidity. But it will never be plausible to say that mankind does 
all that out of sheer stupidity (GB 119) 
 
The same savage, who stabs the picture of his enemy apparently in order to kill him, really 
builds his hut out of wood and carves his arrow skillfully and not in effigy (GB 125) 
 
What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how impossible for him to 
conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time! (GB 125) 
 
Wittgenstein is critical of Frazer, not just because, in his view, Frazer’s approach distorts our 
understanding of religion and magic, but also because it makes for bad science. In particular, it 
makes for a self-subverting – i.e. nonsensical – attempt at anthropology. 
 
One could begin a book on anthropology by saying: When one examines the life and 
behavior of mankind throughout the world, one sees that, except for what might be called 
animal activities […] men also perform actions which bear a characteristic peculiar to 
themselves, and these could be called ritualistic actions.  
  But then it is nonsense to go on to say that the characteristic feature of these 
actions is that they arise from faulty views about the physics of things. (Frazer does this 
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when he says that magic is essentially false physics, or, as the case may be, false medicine, 
technology, etc.). (GB 129, my italics) 
 
Frazer begins with the aim to carry out a detailed empirical study of a number of tribal religious 
practices. However, this aim is consistently defeated by the a priori commitments he brings to 
bear on his research – in particular, his commitment to the view that religion and magic must be 
understood here as (defective) forms of physics. This a priori commitment prevents Frazer’s 
methodology from fulfilling its purpose: it renders Frazer unable properly to attend to the 
empirical data he so painstakingly collects or to render genuinely intelligible these practices to 
himself or others (stupidity being a limiting case of intelligibility). His treatment of the material 
thus ends up resulting in self-subverting nonsense.  
 If by scientism we mean the attempt to bring together scientific and other (often a priori) 
approaches in manners that are self-subverting, then scientism poses a threat to science itself – 
not just to ethics, religion, or philosophy. Wittgenstein’s insistence that we should keep 
philosophical practices separate from scientific ones aims to protect science from distortion, as 
much as it aims to protect philosophy. This idea emerges repeatedly in Wittgenstein’s writings. 
Consider, for instance, his somewhat exasperated reply to Russell’s question about the Tractatus’ 
remarks on thought, in a 1919 letter from Cassino: 
 
[Russell asks] ‘...But a Gedanke [a thought] is a Tatsache [a non-elementary fact]: what are 
its constituents and components, and what is their relation to the pictured Tatsache?’ [To 
which Wittgenstein replies] I don’t know what the constituents of a thought are […]. Again 
the kind of relation of the constituents of the thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It 
would be a matter of psychology to find out. (NB 129 – letter to Russell, Cassino, 19.8.19.) 
 
The claim ‘It would be a matter of psychology to find out’ is as protective of psychology (which 
Wittgenstein regards as a natural science – TLP 4.1121) as it is protective of philosophy: 
Wittgenstein is reminding Russell that his question serves a purpose when asked by a natural 
scientist, but not when asked by a philosopher – certainly not when asked by a philosopher with 
the emphasis that Russell lays on it (cf. Tejedor 2015a, 73–90).  
 A similar idea emerges in Wittgenstein’s critical remarks on popular science.10 O. K. 
Bouwsma notes that Wittgenstein was not opposed to popular science as such, but only to 
specific forms of popular science, which he regarded as intellectually dishonest. Bouwsma 
writes: 
 
In fact, [Wittgenstein] recommended Faraday’s The Chemical History of a Candle as an 
illustration of fine popular science. He objected to sensationalism, and what he called the 
cheating. [He thought that] Eddington and Jeans cheat. A fine work in this order would 
have to be very careful; analogies would be well chosen and nicely worked out. (1949-1951, 
28) 
  
The contrast alluded to by Bouwsma emerges with some force when one considers some of the 
texts in question. Faraday’s The Chemical History of a Candle is a careful, painstaking piece that 
sets to explain with great clarity a narrowly circumscribed scientific matter: the chemical 
composition and functioning of candles. Consider, for instance, the following passage: 
 
Here is a frame, with a number of moulds fastened in it. The first thing to be done is to 
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put a wick through them. Here is one … supported by a little wire. It goes to the bottom, 
where it is pegged in … At the upper part there is a little bar placed across, which 
stretches the cotton and holds it in the mould. The tallow is then melted, and the moulds 
are filled. After a certain time, when the moulds are cool, the excess of tallow is poured 
off at one corner, and then cleaned off altogether, and the ends of the wick cut away. The 
candles alone then remain in the mould, and you have only to upset them, … when out 
they tumble, for the candles are made in the form of cones, being narrower at the top than 
at the bottom: so that, what with their form and their own shrinking, they only need a little 
shaking, and out they fall. In the same way are made these candles of stearin and of 
paraffine. (1861, 15) 
By contrast, Eddington’s works of popular science, unlike his more specialised or academic 
scientific texts, are peppered with metaphysically-laden, often grandiose statements:  
 
Man is slightly nearer to the atom than to the star … From his central position man can 
survey the grandest works of Nature with the astronomer, or the minutest works with the 
physicist. … [K]nowledge of the stars leads through the atom; and important knowledge 
of the atom has been reached through the stars (1929 [1927], 9) 
 
Take the living human brain endowed with mind and thought … The physicist brings his 
tools and commences systematic exploration. All that he discovers is a collection of atoms 
and electrons and fields of force arranged in space and time, apparently similar to those 
found in inorganic objects. He may trace other physical characteristics, energy, 
temperature, entropy. None of these is identical with thought … How can this collection 
of ordinary atoms be a thinking machine? (1929, 258-259) 
 
We have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained 
from nature that which the mind has put into nature. 
We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised 
profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded 
in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own.  
(1921, 200-201)   
 
For Wittgenstein, popular science texts such as Eddington’s (like Frazer’s anthropological 
writings, but unlike Faraday’s The Chemical History of a Candle), present a self-subverting 
quality, a lack of clarity in purpose that renders them both dishonest (a ‘cheat’) and nonsensical. 
Eddington’s popular science texts purport to serve a semi-metaphysical purpose and, in so doing, 
end up constituting neither (good) philosophy nor (good) popular science. Wittgenstein must 
have been thinking of what were, in his view, poor examples of popular science (such as 
Eddington’s), when he decided to give a lecture on ethics rather than a (bad) ‘popular scientific 
lecture’ at The Heretics Society meeting in Cambridge, in 1929 (LE 4).    
Scientism – understood as the self-subverting attempt to bring together scientific and 
other methodologies – distorts our understanding of science, just as it distorts our other practices. 
In this respect, Wittgenstein is as concerned with scientism as a threat from science as he is with 
scientism as a threat to science.  
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1 See, for instance, Monk, 1990, 485–6; McGuinness, 2002, 116–130; Phillips, 1993, esp. 56–78). 
2 I will be using the Ogden translation of the Tractatus as my default in this paper: although the 
translation by Pears and McGuinness is in many ways superior to Ogden’s, I find that Ogden’s 
helps to shed light on key aspects of Wittgenstein’s discussion of science. I will therefore be 
using ‘TLP’ as my abbreviation for the Ogden translation. When I quote from the Pears-
McGuinness translation, I will signal this by using the abbreviation ‘TLP [PM]’. 
3 Wittgenstein’s claim (LE 4) that a ‘superficial curiosity’ about science is associated with the 
‘lowest desire’ of modern people certainly allows for the view that deeper-level scientific 
curiosity might be associated with a higher form of desire.  I am grateful to Ian James Kidd for 
drawing my attention to this point.  
4 Senseful propositions represent possible states and are bivalent and bipolar; senseless 
propositions, in contrast, are either tautological or contradictory. Nonsensical propositions, in 
turn, are neither senseful nor senseless. We will be revisiting Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense 
towards the end of this paper.   
5 I defend this view further in Tejedor, 2015a, 91–137. 
6 This obscuring is, in any case, not a loss, since any possibility hidden in this way can in 
principle be revealed again by means of logical analysis.   
7 In this respect, there are, I believe, important connections to be drawn between Wittgenstein’s 
earlier remarks on the form of scientific systems and his later remarks on ‘forms of life’. On this, 
see Tejedor, 2015b. 
8 See, for instance, Conant, 2000, 174–217 and Hacker, 2000, 353–355. 
9 A similar point is made by McGuinness, 2002, 359. Cf. Monk, 1990, 282. I am grateful to 
Jonathan Beale for drawing my attention to these. 
10 I am indebted to John Preston for first drawing my attention to this point: see Preston, 2012. 
